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ABSTRACT 
Cotton has great importance to the global trade market, and could be a solution of 
economic improvement in developing countries. Although, African cotton is generally 
cheaper to produce, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali have experienced difficulties to 
maintain competitiveness on the market. The reason is cotton subsidies, which are 
stimulus of price settings, and therefore prejudicing for cotton production in smaller 
economies. Thus, the sector has caused economic issues due to distribution of subsidies, 
which has also resulted in a politic value of the crop. There are several studies that relate 
the institutional theory on institution structure, legislation and decision-making processes 
within the WTO, but not many are directly applied on the cotton dilemma. Still, the 
cotton issue is a case study that demonstrates something greater; being a very central 
issue on the WTO agenda - it is an example on WTO multinational structures, and 
demonstrates how less powerful Member countries put their interests on the WTO 
agenda. 
 
The first formal complaint at the WTO on US cotton subsidies was carried out by Brazil 
in 2002, asserting that the US subsidies on cotton ignored the global trade agreements. 
Subsidies were declared to cause reduction in export profit and recession in price, which 
made it difficult for minor producers to be competitive on the global cotton market. In the 
end of April 2003, the C4 laid out a proposition on how to resolve the issues of cotton 
subsidies. However, the C4 proposition failed, with no outcome. In December 2013, C4 
forwarded a second proposal for cotton during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali. It 
was grounded on developing countries progress and ability in the trade of cotton. The 
meeting agreed on implementation of the so-called Bali-package, where the C4 proposal 
was included. The WTO dispute mechanism purpose is to provide countries to solve 
disagreements through discussion rather than war. Cotton is currently very much a part on 
the WTO agenda, and the gradual change of attitude towards the cotton issue will 
hopefully give the Bali-package prospects and efficiency. However, it is difficult to 
evaluate legal aspects against political, and legal decision-making have to be 
implemented in order to make a difference. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cotton is a natural fibre used daily around the world, and the possible areas of use are 
many. This makes cotton a significant cash crop, but has also developed economic issues 
in Least Developed Countries (LDC) throughout the years due to distribution of cotton 
subsidies (Oxfam 2002). Even if African cotton is generally cheaper to produce than 
American cotton, the US subsidy amount use to supply its farmers with a great advantage 
as they can sell their commodity to a low-price and competitive cost. The issue 
consequently developed a politic importance to the cotton market, and has been debated 
during several years within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Oxfam October 2004). 
The cotton issue is not a well know public issue, however, there are several studies and 
articles that bring up the dilemma. The earlier research that has been done agrees (more or 
less) that subsidies are stimulus of price settings and have had damaging effects on the 
global trade flow and competitiveness. Thus, cotton subsidies have had prejudicing 
effects for cotton farmers in smaller economies. The West African cotton producers 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (known as the Cotton-4 or the C4), rely on cotton 
export revenues as they export the majority of the yield. Therefore, the cotton trade can 
be seen as a solution of economic improvement in developing countries (Oxfam 
2002:1ff). 
 
The first formal complaint on the US cotton subsidies was carried out by Brazil in 2002, 
asserting that the US cotton subsidies ignored the global trade agreements constituted of 
the WTO. The WTO panel declared that the US cotton subsidies where causing reduction 
in export profit and recession in cotton prices, which made it difficult for minor producers 
to be competitive on the global cotton market. However, WTO cannot enforce an 
agreement to be implemented, but can authorise counter-measures when regulations are 
ignored. Since the US ignored some implementation of decisions on cotton subsidies 
agreed upon during the dispute, the WTO authorised a cross-retaliation of approximately 
900 million dollars to Brazil. Nevertheless, before these were effected US and Brazil 
came to a mutual agreement where US provided a 147,3 million dollar compensation to 
Brazil, leaving some agreements still not fully implemented (WTO, 2009).  
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The disputes are costly, time consuming and requiring a great deal of legal resources. 
This limits smaller economies, such as the C4, ability to argue their case within the WTO, 
having to seek other alternatives to do so. C4 have since the beginning of the first formal 
complaint been active in the debate on cotton subsidies, and forwarded proposals both 
during the Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, and during the Ministerial 
Conference in Bali 2013. Both with various outcomes (Meagher, ACWL).  
 
Furthermore, the issue of cotton subsidies have been brought up and decided upon in 
several WTO proposals since the first complaint in 2002. In 2004, an agreement of the 
July-Package was made that urged WTO Members to improve in cotton issues and trade 
(WTO, 2004). In 2005, during a Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, focus was yet 
again applied upon issue of cotton. It recalled the July Package agreement, both 
addressing cotton issues linked trade policy and the importance of completing agreement 
implementations (WTO, 2005). The third decision made on cotton was in 2011 during a 
Geneva Minister Conference, focusing on damaging subsidies. Yet again underlining the 
importance to the follow up the agreements made on cotton 2004 and 2005 (WTO, 2011).  
 
1:1 RESEARCH AIM 
During a lengthy period of dispute on cotton subsidies, the C4 have been using numerous 
political instruments in order to forward their interest in the cotton industry. The thesis 
will research the case against US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute, the proposal by 
C4 on elimination of Cotton subsidies in Cancún, and the proposals during the MC9 
meeting in Bali. By studying the cases, the thesis will provide an understanding for the 
different proceedings less powerful countries (using the WTO group C4 as study object) 
in order to protect their interests in the WTO. Moreover, by using the theoretical frame of 
reference, the thesis will discuss how the cotton issue have developed though decision-
making, implementation and debate. The question formulation on which the research aim 
will be based on is: 
 
• Through what line of action does the C4 argue their economic cotton interests, and 
carry out challenges in the political configuration of the WTO? 
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1:2 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH  
The research purpose is to understand by what means C4 argues their interests of the 
cotton industry within the WTO statue. In order to execute the research, the thesis will 
focus on cotton subsidy dispute within the WTO. The cases of interest are: the US: 
Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute, as this is the starting signal cotton dispute; the first 
propositions forwarded 2003 in Cancún by C4; and the second proposal the C4 forwarded 
in Bali 2013. Furthermore, there will be a brief declaration on other decisions made on 
cotton. The geographical and spatial delimitation that will be dominating the thesis are the 
C4 countries, the statue of WTO, and to some extent the US.  
 
The first step of the thesis empirical study will provide an economic geographical 
demonstration over the global cotton market and price. This will establish an 
understanding of Member states position, with focus on the selected geographical 
delimitation. A section on the cotton dilemma, displaying the issue and reason for dispute 
will follow. In order to appreciate the political and legal progress of the cotton issue, the 
second section will display the proceedings of the WTO as a dispute settlement 
mechanism in theory. The third section will clarify disputes, proposals and decisions 
made on cotton, all chosen through purposive sampling for the cotton issues current with 
the ongoing debate. Given the aim of research, the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton 
dispute demonstrates a line of action the C4 takes in order to argue their case to the WTO. 
Brazil usually speaks for the developing countries (C4 included) (WTO interview) and a 
C4 country was acting as third party, which makes the dispute a valuable addition to the 
thesis. The study also includes the two different proposals forwarded by the C4 and 
supported by other developing countries. The cases demonstrate further proceedings and 
propositions that the C4 have used in order to forward interests and case. Other decisions 
that have been agreed on cotton within the configuration of WTO will also be noted in the 
thesis. As a decision has to be implemented in order to be effective and the study will 
therefore, also discuss the level of implementation, as well as how the issue developed 
though decision-making and debate. This will give further understanding of dispute 
progress and effectiveness through the different proceedings used. 
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2. THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will demonstrate the theoretical reference frame, which is applied on the 
conclusion in order to assign a meaning to the result. First section will elucidate the 
basic meaning of the institutional theory, whereas the last sections will define useful 
appellations and theoretical attitudes that will be applied on the thesis conclusion.  
 
2:1 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons, two economists, issued forth the attitudes in the 
neoclassical theory and established the Institutional theory during the twentieth century. 
The neoclassical approach believed that economic actors based decision-making on self-
interest. Whereas, the institutional theory distinguish other attitudes where decision-
making is based on several different facts rather than only economical effects. 
Furthermore, the institutional approach believes that economic perceptive has to be 
integrated with political and social aspects. The approach, therefore, acknowledge the 
non-economic factors within an economic activity, the governments and institutions that 
determine regulations and attitudes in the market (Hayter and Patchell 2011:xiv).  
 
Doguglass C. North (1990:3f) begins the edition Institutions, Institutional Change, and 
Economic Performance with the sentence “Institutions are rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devise constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North 1990:3). This outlines the influences and forms of organisations that occurs in 
relation to economic, governmental or public forums. North further asserts that 
institutions can influence economic development, and the different levels of 
accomplishment are influenced by institutional progress.  
 
The institutional approach demonstrates that economic structures are shaped through 
institution - institution attitudes and performance are shaped and demonstrated through 
legal systems, agreements, set procedures, and regulation of management. This develops 
institution structures on different governmental levels (Hayter et al, 2011:xviii). 
However, economic geographers sought to apply institutional notions on further study 
areas: institutional space and institutional thickness. The institutional space comprises 
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the geographical area in which the institutions are active and has efficacious 
accomplishment. Furthermore, Martin (2000:87) asserts the institutional space declares 
hierarchy through out different geographical levels of governance. Noting the 
supranational level act the part of international agreements on competitions, economic 
relations and trade. The notion and setting of institutional space further alters between 
geographical areas (ibid: 87). The other economic geographic concept of institutional 
theory is institutional thickness. The notion is demonstrated through high-level 
institutional commitment, and the study area also involves interaction networking 
between Members that develop understanding and congenial actions. Which for example 
can be noted in the groupings within the WTO, such as the C4. Institutional thickness 
further demonstrates the definable constructions authority, alignment, as well as delegated 
to the collective of Members, to diminish partiality and disputes. The last component of 
institutional thickness shows the comprehensiveness and organisation of institution, to 
emerge purpose and agenda, which can result to development. The components of 
institutional thickness state the level of reliability and transparency of institution (ibid: 
88).  
 
2:2 FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS  
Institutions can either be brought into existence or develop through time, and are 
categorised as either formal or informal. Formal institutions are connected with 
formulated policies such as regulations and law, agreements and committee mandates. 
They function within a rule system on various geographical levels, enforced by economic 
and non-economic institutions (North 1990:4). Stutz and Warf (2007:170) assert the 
importance of state and formation of legal structures, as moral principles usually are 
based through laws. Informal institutions are linked to values, human behaviour, trust and 
traditions. The institutional framework, therefore, comprise both formal regulations and 
informal “codes of conduct” (North 1990:4). The author further compares this with sports 
where players bide by the code due to informal attitude. However, when regulations and 
informal behaviour have been broken, retaliation or punishment will serve the formal 
institutional purpose. The difference of formal and informal institutions, therefore, 
displays a supplementation of each other - but could also need separate analysis. Trust is 
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an important notion within trade, which is emphasised and valued both in formal and 
informal institutions (North 1990:4). 
 
2:3 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE   
Hayter et al (2011:xvf) emphasise the institutional approach to economic geography 
focus on markets and trade flows being important do to transactions within economies or 
multinational economic activity. The Institutional theory can be illustrated though three 
components.  Embeddedness, defines the notion on integration of different economic 
elements, which for analytic reasons only can be comprehensible as an abstract relation to 
each other. The second component is differentiation that emphasises the varieties of 
political, economical, and natural environments and development. This is demonstrated in 
geographical perceptions of “local models” and “world production”, which shows 
geographic differences caused by institutional interactions (North 1990:6).  
 
Evolution, the third component in institutional approach, asserts the changeability of 
markets and economies as a result location, natural and social environment, and 
institutional activities. The component is an essential part of the thesis as it demonstrates 
the development over time of formal and informal institution within the WTO, i.e. the 
progress of the cotton dilemma. There are two different forms of institutional change that 
need contemplation. (1) Institution of change in attitude, which define the institution 
structure and property. (2) Internal change is a development and progress of the 
institutional arrangement, which acknowledge the attitude structure. Thus, in order to get 
profound developments, the change of attitude is necessary (Peters 2000:7f) Furthermore, 
Peters (1999:144f) underlines a definition from Krasner on international regimes to be 
attitudes of rules, values and decision-making measures within a geographical space of 
international relations, in which the submission of different actors are united.  
 
Peters (2000:16) declares the aspects that institutions are inevitably in constant change as 
an effect of Members conduct in combination of institution regulations. Institutions 
eliminate contingency in society by providing a substantial structure to political, 
economical, and social collaborations. However, it is inevitable that these collaborations 
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will be changing and with it, the institution. The development of institutional change is 
complex and usually done gradually, instead of being an abrupt and uneven process. An 
institutional change can be a result in alterations of regulation, which, however, can be 
limited through informal attitudes or vary in implementation effectiveness. Formal 
institution changes in forms of regulations and can change over night due to jurisdictions 
and decision-makings. Whereas, informal institutions demonstrate change through 
traditions and behaviour, codes of conduct, which North asserts is much more resistant to 
modifications and institution developments (North 1990:6). Any institutional change, 
therefore, is effected by attitudes and beliefs within the Member States, which will be 
mirrored in power play and position of Members (Cumbers, MacKinnon and McMaster 
2003:327).  
 
Furthermore, institutional change is established through knowledge - how actors 
understand and respond to information (Peters 1999:78). North (1990:74) asserts that 
institutional actors and their knowledge of the political configuration within institutions is 
a great factor of how the framework is structured. Hence, the regulation will be 
reproduced and effected differently due to knowledge of the political game and 
organisation.  
 
2:4 THEORETICAL PURPOSES   
The theoretic purpose of the thesis is hereby to clarify the notion of institutional level of 
agency within the WTO and its Members. In order to understand the decision-power 
within the configuration the thesis foremost concentrates on formal and informal 
institution. This will provide an understanding for the effect different line of action and 
proceedings used in the WTO may have.  
 
Change can define alterations of regulations, standards and authority, which the Members 
respond to. Stability within institution makes change over time and space achievable, and 
improves the understanding of structure and gradual change. A change of formal 
regulation will lead to an imbalanced structure; therefore, in order to achieve institutional 
change and balance there is a need of both informal and formal implementation and 
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acceptance (North 1990:83 and 87). For this reason, institutional change will be of 
importance to the study, to give further understanding to the case progress throughout the 
years. Figure 1 is based on the written clarification of institutional change above and 
provides the thesis with an example of how institutional change may appear over time 
within the WTO structure. The purpose is to use indications of formal and informal 
institutions in the WTO, in order to understand institutional change and progress of the 
cotton issue.  
 
Figure 1: The process of institutional change – Demonstrates the system that will be used 
in the thesis analysis. The figure is created by the author of this thesis, and based on the 
abovementioned theory material.  
 
 
 
  
Formal	  change(regulations,	  agreement	  and	  decision)	  
Imbalanced	  structure	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  in	  the	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  change	  
Informal	  institution	  (attitudes	  and	  values)	  change	  over	  time	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  and	  possibility	  to	  implement	  decision	  on	  a	  national	  level	  	  	   Improved	  trade	  conditions	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3. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The chapter will illuminate former studies on cotton and the WTO statue. First section 
will clarify research that have been made on the cotton issue and been central in the 
debate. Furthermore, the last section will elucidate former studies that have been made 
both on the subject of the institutional theory and the WTO. This will simplify the 
analytical part and give further understanding on how to approach the issue, as well as 
future challenges for the cotton dilemma. Furthermore, a demonstration of former 
research emphasis the thesis social approach and notion, as well as what timeframe 
limitation intended to be cut out and studied.  
 
3:1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE COTTON ISSUE 
The debate on cotton subsides issues was, without questioning, primarily led by Oxfam. 
In 2002, the organisation wrote Cultivating Poverty – The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies 
on Africa, which displayed the cotton world market crisis and raised the importance of 
Brazils complaint on the US within the WTO. The Oxfam briefing paper emphasised the 
damage the subsidies were doing, in particularly to the African countries, which put 
awareness to the global publicity (Oxfam 2002:1ff). In June 2004, Oxfam wrote a second 
paper on the matter titled Dumping: the Beginning of the End. The paper brought up the 
Panel findings in the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute and different cotton 
subsidies that the US was using. Furthermore, in the paper Oxfam gave notions on why 
implementations of WTO recommendations were essential (Oxfam June 2004:1ff). The 
paper, therefore, is of value to the thesis as it argues a central issue and disadvantage 
within the WTO structure when it comes to cotton subsidies. Furthermore, Oxfam 
followed up with Finding the Moral Fiber, Why reform is urgently needed for a fair 
cotton trade, a third briefing paper published in October the same year. The paper brought 
up the previous decisions made on cotton that had failed to be followed (Oxfam October 
2004:1ff). In 2007, Alston, Sumner and Brunke, professors in the department of 
agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, published a paper 
supported by Oxfam America. The paper was titled Impacts of Reductions in US Cotton 
Subsidies on West African Cotton Producers, and displayed the impact US cotton 
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subsidies had on world market prices, and the effect a price increase would have on poor 
countries (Alston et al 2007:1ff). The briefing papers, which have been published by 
Oxfam, have highlighted the eminent issue of subsidies and are evidently a great impact 
of bringing the subject forward, both from the institution to the public.  
 
In November 2010, the Fairtrade Foundation published a report on cotton dilemma titled 
“The Great Cotton Stich-Up”. The report displays that since the initiative of the WTO 
Doha Development Round in 2001, developed countries have had over 40 billion dollars 
provided to cotton production by supporting programs. Which have led to direct losses in 
income revenues for West African farmers. The report discusses the political plays that 
have been appearing after Brazil decided to withhold retaliations and accept US 
compensation. Furthermore, it underlines what the opportunity C4 has “to take US to 
court”. The Fairtrade report, therefore, brings up an issue that is central to the perception 
of this thesis. However, the report arguments are based on conceptions and outcome of 
the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute (Fairtrade Foundation 2010:5ff). Whereas, 
this thesis arguments differs as they are based on how and why the cotton issues have 
progressed and changed during the years – due to different decisions made and proposals 
declined within the configurations WTO.  
 
In 2011, Baffes, senior economist at the World Bank, published Cotton Subsidies, the 
WTO, and the ‘Cotton Problem’. Baffes debates limitations like disorganisation and lack 
of technological development of the cotton industry in the West and Central African 
countries. The report further studies what effects the agreement between Brazil and the 
US has had, complexity of development and structural changes (Baffes 2011:1534ff).  
 
The ongoing debate has been of value to the cotton issue, which has kept the debate on 
cotton subsidies and unfair trade conditions alive. Although, reports structures insistently 
somewhat differs due to underlying values and approaches, former researches more or 
less agrees that subsidies have had impairing effects on cotton trade and price.  
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3:2 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTION OF WTO  
There are several studies that relate the institutional theory on institution structure, 
legislation and decision-making processes with the WTO, but not many are directly 
applied on the cotton dilemma. Still, the cotton issue is a case study that demonstrates 
something greater; being a very central issue on the WTO agenda it is an example on how 
the political structure appears within WTOs multinational institution. Thus, former 
researches on the cotton dilemma indirect demonstrate institutional approaches and 
attitudes within the WTO. Equally, researches on institutional structure within the WTO 
indirect displays possible progresses in the cotton cases.  
 
In the article “ A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law”, Frischmann 
(2003:691f) argues that international agreements are a result of nations being economic 
and social “interdependent” to one another. For this reasons have national decisions and 
submission an impact on other nations trade and social-welfare. The international 
institution is very much implied on national regulations and structures, which is adopted 
in national industries and laws. Furthermore, trust is an important notion and emphasised 
both in formal and informal institutions. According to Hayter et al (2011:22) China is 
seen as a formal “low-trust country” due to the political instability, whereas, the US are 
treated as a “trustworthy country”. However, Hayter et al further stress that US often tend 
to work against development of permanent economic relations and decisions. Frischmann 
(2003:691f) asserts that even when countries decide not to comply with an international 
agreement, informal institution is still applied on how and to what extent the agreements 
are violated.  
 
In Remedies Under the WTO Legal System Babu brings up the US: Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton dispute case. Like most briefing papers the arguments are established on outcomes 
and processes of the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute. It is obvious that processes 
of the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute case have been the most relevant case to 
analyse on the subject of cotton subsidies. However, the Bali-package is new in the 
process, and therefore of interest to examine further. In order to analyse decisions made 
on cotton and its processes, the thesis is using a broader spectrum of decisions and 
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proposals, both in the cotton dilemma and the rather contemporary institutional theory. 
The theory is relevant to apply on the WTO statue as it can consider both incorporation 
and nation-less integration between actors in a global structured framework. The reason 
for Babu study being of importance to the thesis is that the book observes relative 
perceptions of the gaps and shortcomings in the Dispute Settlement system in the WTO. 
It also provides a comparison to several different cases within the WTO. For example, 
Babu argues that former WTO disputes, like the EC Banana case, have founded an 
opinion amongst LDC Members that the Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the WTO 
is meaningless due to absence of compliance from developed countries when a decision 
has been made. The report indicates that a meaningful retaliation against the US would be 
impossible for a smaller economy (Babu 2012:424).  
 
“ It was observed that “the question of little or no utilization of the WTO dispute 
settlement by developing and least-developed country Members has been linked to the 
inadequacies and structural rigidities of the remedies available to poor countries that 
successfully litigate a dispute before the dispute settlement”. For example, any retaliatory 
measures taken by Ecuador against EU goods or services, even if they could have 
captured the full amount of nullification or impairment suffered by Ecuador, would have 
offered no relief to Ecuador’s exporters of bananas. The damage these exporters suffered 
as a result of the EU’s regime had not been, and, under the WTO’s current system, could 
not be repaired…there are no remedy for lost trade opportunities during the period of 
dispute settlement and the implementation process” (Babu 2012:424).  
 
Institution matter is a statement that has been given great awareness when it comes to 
understand economic growth and development structures. Busch, Raciborski and 
Reinhardt (2007:1ff) claims there is a common statement that institution matters if the 
more dominant states is supporting decisions made within institutions. However, the 
authors disagree with this statement and disputes that the institution of WTO contributes 
implementations of current trade agreements within a dispute settlement mechanism. 
They argue that even though the complainant cannot retaliate, an opposing decision by 
the dispute settlement body may informally injure the defendant e.g. in other disputes, 
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both as defendant and complainant, in the future. Peters (1999:151) asserts, 
“international relations are usually seen as the domain of anarchy, rather than an area 
in which stable institutions operate”. Nevertheless, he stresses organisations demonstrate 
the stability and liability, which is applied on the definition on institution. Hayter et al 
(2011:20f) claims that several international institutions have not been able to carry 
through all regulations due to the amount of submission from different Members that is 
needed on a global scale. Governments have the ability to influence industries and 
purchasers on all spatial levels. However, on the international market level authority and 
interactions are not as distinct.  
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4. METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK 
The chapter will clarify the selection of method, its significance and appliance, and 
feasibility of the thesis process as profoundly as possible. 
  
4:1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In order to define necessary material for the case study, the thesis will be executed 
through an abductive reasoning of method. The method implements a capacity to assume 
which requirements that would elucidate a research conclusion. Moreover, the abductive 
approach provides the thesis with questions and increasing interest, resulting from 
collection of material on the WTO progresses on the issues of cotton subsidies. The 
material will raise further queries, which will develop more intellectual presumptions. 
Theory and case is interweaved with each other, which makes the abductive method a 
subject of change that constructs a more diverse and varied research - created and effected 
around determined material. The subject is based on facts to gain an unbiased setting, 
which in a later stage are conformed to the theory approach. The method, therefore, 
provides the thesis narrative a broad approach (Gren and Hallin, 2003:2, 219). 
 
4:2 SECONDARY SOURCES  
The thesis will be based on documents and literature from governmental and non-
governmental institutions. WTO documents are foremost going to be used as a secondary 
source in order to illuminate the progress that the cotton issue have made from the first 
dispute to the last decision. In order to understand the reason for the dispute, it is of 
importance to include the aspects of the dilemma. Non-governmental documents from 
Oxfam and other authors will provide a more analytical view and explanation of the issue, 
which will give integrity to the thesis. The use of secondary sources provides an 
appreciation of proceedings and issues, which gives the different historical standpoints 
from studies and proceedings in the WTO. Therefore, it significant to get a broad 
understanding for the industry and production, which makes sources like the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
and Index webpages important. The material will provide a historical background and 
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give understanding of the industry and the varied production levels through out the 
dispute years. The secondary material is used in order to provide understanding and 
comprehensive background information. Hence, this will effectuate the analysis and work 
as a foundation for the interview result. Therefore, it is of importance that each source is 
evaluated with serious examination and assessment, before included in the thesis. The 
dissertation method aim is based on literature study from documents and early research, 
with complementary interviews.  
 
4:3 INTERVIEWS 
The thesis is foremost constituted on data obtained from literature; an addition of facts 
based on profound interviews would gain a more up-to-date understanding of the effect of 
rather lengthy debates. The case study will therefore include qualitative interview data 
that will be based on profound interviews with governmental institutions and 
organisations that withhold a relationship to WTO and the cotton industry.  
 
4:3:1 SELECTION CRITERIA 
Governmental institutions of interest are Kommerskollegium, WTO and the Mission 
Ambassador of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad, based in Geneva. Organisations 
that are of interest are the ICAC, Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) and Oxfam. 
Furthermore, the interviews will either be via phone, email or vis-á-vis, depending on 
relevance, and the time limitation might not allow personal meetings with all institutions 
of interest. The broadness and interconnectedness of the different interviews will produce 
a larger prospective of advantages and disadvantages the WTO and its Members have. 
The qualitative method, therefore, provides a comprehensive understanding of the case, 
additional to the collected material.  
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The interviewees were:  
 
• Martin Magnusson and Isabelle Ahlström, representing the WTO unit at 
Kommerskollegium;  
 
• WTO source (who wanted to stay anonymous) from the Agriculture and 
Commodities Division;  
 
• Andrei Guitchounts, Director of trade analyses of the ICAC; 
 
• Niall Meagher, Executive Director ACWL. 
 
 
The interviewees were picked to gain knowledge on procedures and power diversion 
within the WTO. Furthermore, the interviewees will provide knowledge on both formal 
and informal institutional progresses that appears in WTO, as well as institutional change.   
 
4:3:2 SURVEY 
The research method will obtain semi-structured interviews with several main questions 
that will give room for discussion and further question depending on the expertise of the 
interview subject.  
 
After studying the report of the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute, it was evident 
that the accused country (in this case the US) does not always comply with the 
recommendations given. Following questions were asked: 
 
1) How would you describe the extent of legal power the WTO holds when it comes 
to the cotton dispute and its outcome? 
 
2) What advantages and disadvantages does the WTO have as a dispute settlement 
mechanism for the C4 and the cotton issues? 
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3) How have the level of implementation effected the C4? 
 
The questions will provide understanding to why the level of implementation is rather 
low in relations to agreed recommendations on cotton. Also gives hypothetical 
standpoints and power play within the WTO. Furthermore, the second question was asked 
in order to display the possibilities or inferiors the C4 has in a dispute or proposal 
settlement. The third question was referring to the informal attitudes of the WTO. If a 
decision was made they have to be effectuated amongst the Members – formal institution 
being affected of informal attitudes. Furthermore, ACWL was also asked: 
 
4) What role did ACWL have as assistant in the US dispute proceeding for Chad as a 
third party? 
 
5) For what reasons does LDCs need the legal help ACWL can provide?  
 
 
The ACWL questions were asked to demonstrate C4s position within the WTO, and what 
proceedings enables the group to carry through a dispute in the institution. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages C4 has within the institution and by what 
means they are able to forward their opinions.  
 
The dispute between the US and Brazil ended in a Memorandum of Understanding and 
the Framework Agreement, where the two countries have agreed upon meeting four times 
a year to develop a mutual decision of the cotton dispute. This resulted in retaliations 
against US were being withheld by Brazil, and instead compensation of approximately 
147 million dollars were given to Brazilian farmers. Following questions were asked to 
elucidate the affect this has on the C4, and in what way the subject considers such 
resolution. Furthermore, this demonstrates the level of participation that C4 have had in 
the dispute. Question eight was asked in order to see level of implementations and 
therefore the informal attitude on decisions along with different instrument in WTO 
power play amongst Members. The discussion generally resulted in further questions if 
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this might an alternative way for C4 to enter a dispute and implementation level on 
decision-making within the institution.  
 
6) What consequences have the cross-boarder subsidies, given to the Brazilian cotton 
production, had on the C4 farmers and the global cotton trade? 
 
7) What can the countries with interest in this negotiation, such as the C4, do to 
precipitate a decision-making?  
 
8) How have the situation changed today since the dispute began in 2002? 
 
 
C4 have forwarded two proposals on cotton issues to the WTO, Cancún 2003 and this 
year for the upcoming MC9 meeting in Bali. Question nine was asked before the meeting 
was executed. Independent of the outcome of the proposal, as it forces the respondent to 
discuss the political structure in the WTO, and thereby understand C4s position further. 
Furthermore, the question will demonstrate the possibility for C4 to carry through 
proposals within the WTO. Whereas, question ten was asked after the MC9 meeting had 
been settled. To relate and recognise what level of impact the undertaking of the decision 
has on C4 as well as level of implementation that is expected in the future compared to 
the lack of implementation that has been dominating decisions on cotton before. 
Furthermore, this demonstrates both the formal and informal changes within the 
institution. Question thirteen was asked in order to understand the power play within the 
WTO statue and how this shows in the importance of this type of cartel formation. It will 
give further understanding to this type of institutional thickness and its advantages. The 
last question can demonstrate future development of the cotton issue, and how this will 
occur in an institution change. 
 
 
9) What do you believe the prospects are for the upcoming discussion and conclusion 
of the cotton proposal during MC9 in Bali? 
 
10) For what reasons did the C4 proposal 2003 in Cancún, not carry though? 
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11) For what reasons have C4 “only” forwarded proposals to the WTO, and not 
initiate a dispute like Brazil? 
 
12) What provisions for C4 cotton production and export do you believe will be 
improved after the MC9 meeting in Bali? How does this affect cotton sector in the 
Least Developed countries?  
 
13) How does the political grouping between C4 help the West African cotton 
producers, than if they were forwarded a proposal separately? 
 
14) How would you describe the future outlook for the C4 cotton production and 
trade? 
 
 
4:3:3 INTERVIEWS EFFECTS 
First of all, the process of finding interviewees is time consuming and due to elected 
interview types it will not always be approachable. Secondly, the problematic part of this 
type of interviews is the analysis, the ability to understand and analyse non-standardised, 
profound answers. Thus, one can argue it to be a question of interpretation based on the 
collected material from interviews.  
 
The interviewees from Kommerskollegium sat in the same room. This did lead to a more 
profound discussion between us, however, the interviewees might have affected each 
other to some extent and thereby the result. Furthermore, the interview with WTO was 
executed through the phone, and on request of the interviewee the call was not to be 
recorded. This might have affected the amount of information that could be obtained from 
the interview.  
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5. EMPIRICAL STUDY  
The chapter will be executed in three different parts: a clarification of the cotton market, 
price and cotton dilemma; a description of the WTO dispute settlement procedure; and 
finally a profound elucidation of the decision made or proposed on cotton in the WTO 
settlement mechanism.  
 
5:1 INTRODUCTION TO THE COTTON MARKET  
Cotton constitutes about 35 percent of global fibre appliance, which makes it one of the 
utmost significant cash crops in the world (USDA, March 2013). The trade flow between 
geographical territories is vast, and the fibre gets exported and imported several times 
before the refined product reaches its final destination. The industry withholds 
employments for 250 million people, a majority being part of populations in different 
levels of developing countries (WTO October 2013). Furthermore, about 80 countries are 
estimated to produce cotton. The largest producers are China, India, and the US, which 
accounts for two-thirds of the production (USDA, 2012). The US, who has had a rather 
steady production rate for several decades (Index Mundi, United States 2012), is the 
world-leading exporter of cotton (USDA March 2013).  
 
In 2012, Terry Townsend, Executive Director of ICAC, denoted that the prices of cotton 
had varied between $0.50 and $0.90 per pound between 2007 and 2010, a price variation 
between these ratios have been relatively constant. However, Townsend further 
emphasises that cotton season 2010/2011 had an unusually high price increase and at the 
same time a high inconsistency. The value-chain of cotton was not prepared to respond to 
the growing demand from consumers. The cotton prices consequently rose above 2 
dollars per pound in March 2011 reaching its record price, but Townsend stressed that the 
prices was estimated to decrease. As a reaction to the price growth, planted areas of 
cotton increased. The 2011/2012 season was, however, more stable with little fluctuation 
of the price (WTO, 2012:7f). The market of cotton is influenced by several variables 
(subsidies being one of them). During season 2012/2013 the cotton price was 0.88 US 
dollars, as estimated a decrease from previous crop year. Furthermore, it is estimated that 
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the global stock volume will influence the price in the future, descending price pressure. 
Therefore it is of importance to manage the stock to avert a global price reduction (WTO, 
sixth periodic report 2013:5). Table 1 demonstrates a graph over the World cotton price 
between 2000 and 2013. 
 
Table 1: World Cotton Price - The World cotton price variation from 2000 to 2013 
 
 
Source: WTO (2013), sixth periodic report, p. 7 
 
5:1:1 CURRENT COTTON MARKET 
The market has been readapting to the rising prices production rate and yields and 
cultivated areas of cotton. The developments and cotton-related economic growth in LDC 
cotton-producing countries are worthy of note. Especially from the African regions where 
production were accountable for 6 percent of world cotton output during 2012/2013, and 
14 percent of cotton cultivated areas in the world. Furthermore, the export rate improved 
by 30 percent during the same production period, which mainly is due to increasing 
export from Francophone countries, where C4 is included (WTO, sixth periodic report 
2013:2f).  
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In 2012, a WTO Sub-Committee of Cotton meeting was discussing developing aspects of 
cotton; Members and experts on the subject of cotton were present. Townsend elucidated 
the different changes and challenges the cotton production had been facing. The African 
cotton producers accounted for 7 percent of the world production in 2004/2005, a record 
year for Africa. However, the African output got reduced by half when market prices 
dropped during the recession, making the African cotton production global share decrease 
to 4 percent. The production levels in the African cotton regions has been increasing 
lately, and during 2011/2012 Africa accounted for 5 percent of global cotton production. 
The degree of production was, among other reasons, related to the increased areal of land 
for cotton production. Thus, the yield was not improved per hectare. Due to the increase 
of cultivated cotton land, the kilo per hectare dropped in 2011 with approximately 25 
kilograms per hectare (WTO 2012:7ff). According to a WTO report have the latter cotton 
price fall driven some farmers into changing to other crop alternatives with higher rate 
return, which therefore led to 6 percent decrease of the worlds cultivated cotton land. As a 
result of a reduction of cultivated cotton land, the global production decreased with 5 
percent during last season. In countries such as China, Brazil, India and Australia the 
commodity production is reported to have decreased; however in some African countries 
and the US, the production rates have risen (WTO, sixth periodic report 2013:5f).  
 
Townsend asserts that the degree of production is also related to how areal of land is used 
for production. The African region had an output of approximately 400 kilograms per 
hectare in 2011. Due to an increase of cultivated cotton land, the kilo per hectare dropped 
in with approximately 25 kilograms per hectare. Townsend further stresses that the ICAC 
had studied the potential from African farmers (country by country) to increase their yield 
per hectare. The valuation was that with economic investments an increase on an average 
of 500 kilograms per hectare in Africa was expected in the future. Other world producers 
estimated to produce about 800 kilograms per hectare, an increasing number induced by 
improvements of bio-technological amongst other purposes. Therefore, Townsend stated 
that one of the greatest challenges for African producers at the moment is to increase the 
output per hectare in order to improve the competitiveness in the region (WTO 2012:7ff).   
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EXPORT 
Cotton is an important cash crop; produced in about 37 African countries, 30 of them 
being exporters of the commodity (International Trade Center, 6th of December 2013). 
For C4 the cotton industry is central as it contributes to economic development being 
large quote of regional employment, and both an agricultural and foreign exchange 
income source. The commodity is the foremost significant export product for C4. From 
2004 to 2007 the commodity export value were higher than the joint export revenue from 
bean, sugar, tea, cashew nuts and cocoa. During the same period cotton total percentage 
of the agricultural export were: 
 
  
 
 
(Jales, 2010:1). The ICAC asserts import was earlier dominated by Europe, which gave 
African countries advantages in accessibility. However, destination of cotton has 
changed, and imports are now led by Asia, China being the main importer of African 
cotton (ICAC May 2013:3). Since the national price setting in Africa being lower than 
average international price setting African famers export the majority of the yield (WTO 
interviewee) about 95 to 98 percent of the production amount. Therefore, the African 
farmers have an impact on the global cotton market even if they are not major global 
producers (Adams, Boyd, Huffman 2013:69f). Furthermore, the exports of cotton have 
risen in the Francophone African (30 percent), and the US (15 percent) during the last 
cotton season. The African continent has been unevenly successful in its cotton export 
during season 2012/2013. In North Africa the cotton export have decreased, whereas 
countries in East and South Africa have experienced an export increase of 18 percent and 
the Francophone African countries by 30 percent (WTO, sixth periodic report 2013:5f). 
Table 2 displays the top ten cotton exporters in Africa during season 2012/2013. Figure 2 
displays the differences between major exporters of cotton between season 2007/2008 
and 2012/2013.  
 
Burkina Faso – 80 percent 
Mali – 74 percent 
Benin – 59 percent 
Chad – 51 percent 
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Table 2: Top ten African Exporters of Cotton - season 2012/2013 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO (2013), sixth periodic report, p. 6 
 
 
Figure 2: The major exporters of cotton  - demonstrating the differences between season 
2007/2008 and 2012/2013 
Source: ICAC (May 2013), p. 4 
Country   Export volume (Thousand tons) 
Burkina Faso 240 
Mali 198 
Côte D’ivoire  171 
Zimbabwe 136 
Benin 105 
Zambia 87 
Cameroon 86 
Egypt 76 
Tanzania 67 
Mozambique 53 
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IMPORT 
China is the world’s major cotton importer, but during 2012/2013 season the country 
cotton import rate was reduced from 55 percent the previous season to 43 percent of the 
global import total of cotton. It is reported that the cotton import rate by China is 
estimated continuingly to fall during next season. Compared to other countries such as 
Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam where the import rates had increased (WTO, 
October 2013:5). Figure 3 demonstrates the major importers of cotton displaying the 
differences between season 2007/2008 and 2012/2013. 
 
 
Figure 3: The major importers of cotton - demonstrating the differences between season 
2007/2008 and 2012/2013 
Source: ICAC (May 2013), p. 3 
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5:1:2 THE C4 COTTON INDUSTRY 
Several of Member countries have established alliance groups within the WTO, that often 
communicate by having one spokesperson or team to see that work within the group goes 
according to its standpoints. C4 have created such alliance, which four members also are 
active in other alliances (WTO, 2014). Figure four displays a map over the African 
continent, where the geographic position of the C4 countries can be noted on the west 
coast and central parts of Africa.  
 
Although, the US farmers does provide an efficient and more sophisticated production, 
the African cotton is cheaper to produce in terms of farm sizes, and the quality of cotton 
is usually better being picked by hand. In Benin the production cost per pound is 0.30 
dollars, while the American cost about 0.68 to produce per pound of cotton. However, the 
subsidies provided to US farmers gives them the advantage and opportunity to sell their 
cotton for a much more competitive price. Hence, it is generally believed that cotton 
subsidies are stimulus of the price settings and are therefore prejudicing for cotton 
production in smaller economies. (Oxfam October 2004:6 and Woodward 2007:173). 
 
“Cotton farmers in the area have become donkeys who work without earning anything” - 
quote from cotton farmer in Kotokpa, Benin (Oxfam October 2004:7) 
 
The commodity, on its own, accounts for 2 to 5 percent of the national GDP in the C4 
countries. In relation to American farmers, where the cotton industry accounts for 0.0004 
percent for US GDP (Woodward 2007:173). Benin is the most reliant of cotton in the C4 
(Gergely 2009: 11f, V), where 50 percent of the population are dependent on production 
revenue of cotton (Woodward 2007:171ff). An imbalanced trade does, therefore, affect 
the C4 farmers notably and demonstrates how the commodity sector of cotton could be an 
implement for economic growth and social improvement in more rural parts of the world.  
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Figure 4: Map of Africa – the C4 countries geographic position can be observed on the 
below.  
 
Source:	  Maps & Media – Political Geography (January 2014) 
 
5:1:3 THE US COTTON INDUSTRY 
Cotton is cultivated in foremost in the Southeast and west, and the Mid-South and west, 
the area is called the Cotton Belt (Cotton Council International, 2009). The chain of 
American cotton production brings forth roughly 200.000 jobs, and every year it revenues 
over 25 billion dollars. About 97 percent of the cotton crop, Americas most produced 
cotton, is American upland cotton, mainly produced in the Cotton belt area. In 2000 the 
country areas of cotton had increased to about 14,5 million acres of cultivated cotton land. 
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The development towards more sophisticated production instruments, such as 
technological equipment, pest management and irrigation, resulted in a higher cotton 
output in the US cotton production. In year 2006, the of numbers of farms in the US had 
begun to decrease; still, sizes of farms that continued to exist were getting larger. In 2007, 
standard farms in America were about 564 acres (USDA 2012). However, the level of 
production increased concurrently with decreasing cultivated cotton land, a development 
that would not have been possible if it was not for the governmental support. The 
Environmental Working Group asserted US cotton subsidies totalled 32.9 billion dollars 
between 1995 and 2012 (EWG Farm Subsidies 2007-2012). Between 1998 and 2002, the 
US cotton farmers received 21.6 billion dollars in cotton revenues; all the same, the US 
government allocated 14.8 billion dollars to the cotton production during the same time 
period (Oxfam October 2004:14).  
 
“The guy you’re talking about in Africa – I see this is the guy my dad was. I don’t know if 
my dad could have competed in the same situation. It’s a hard business. And I don’t think 
that, without subsidies, we here today could compete with the American farms of the 
1950’s” A quote from a Texas cotton farmer (Oxfam October 2004:7)  
  
5:2 THE COTTON DILEMMA 
During the past decades United States and Europe has subsidies their agricultural sectors, 
such as cotton. United States began to subsidies though price support programs in 1930, 
during the Great Depression. Europe started subsidies in connection with the formation of 
European Community, after the Second World War. The Programs are developed in order 
to protect the sector and the domestic market (Schuh 2002:435). To encourage economic 
growth and reduce economic undertakings, governmental institutions distribute subsidies 
to the cotton industry. Countries such as the US, China and the European Union (EU) 
have been, and still are, the major providers of cotton agriculture subsidies (Gillson, 
Poulton, Balcombe and Page, 2004:15). If the subsidies encourage a production increase, 
it will have an impact on the competition structures and the price rates. However, it also 
depends on the size of the undertaken subsidy and how great the production is. Thus, the 
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influence differs from trade and product (Kommerskollegium 29th of October 2013). In 
the cotton industry subsidies have had such impact on competitiveness, and claimed to be 
a large indicator of a price reduction on cotton creating an imbalanced trade environment 
(Oxfam 2002:1ff). Hence, the prices on cotton are not only determined though supply and 
demand, but also the level of subsidies given to cotton producers and exporters. The 
subsidy amount allocated to the farmers in developed countries each year contributes to 
an unfair trade and a negative development effect for smaller economies that produce 
cotton (Baffes, 2011:1534ff).  
 
Furthermore, an Oxfam research asserts that elimination of cotton subsidies would 
increase market prices with 6-14 percent, which would result in increasing export revenue 
for C4 farmers (Alston et al, 2007). During the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute, 
Brazil stressed that elimination of impairing US exports subsidies would increase market 
prices on cotton with 12,6 percent. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) claimed, together with International Monetary Fund (IMF), that market 
price would have an increase of 2 percent if cotton subsidies were removed (Woodward 
2007:176f). Nevertheless, one can argue that an elimination of certain impairing subsidy 
levels on the cotton market would result in an increase of price. 
 
5:2:1 SUBSIDY DAMAGE 
The US cotton farms have decreased in numbers; however, the survival ability of the 
farms differs. Farms that are considered to be smaller plantation in the US (below 100 
acre) have dropped in numbers; whereas, larger plantation farms with areas above 1000 
acre, have increase during the same period of time (USDA 2012). Still, not all US cotton 
farmers are entitled to support; it is just about 40 percent of the farmers in the US 
receiving subsidies. In 2004, 73 percent of cotton subsidies were distributed to 10 percent 
of the US cotton farmers. Being a major producer and exporter on the cotton market, the 
US formal institution of decision-makings unhesitatingly has large global influence on the 
cotton sector. The US has been using several ways to give domestic support to their 
cotton producers via the US Cotton Program In the US these programs are termed as the 
Farm Bills. The 2008 Farm Bill has been extended to 2014 (USDA Policy, 2012).  
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In 2002, the US contributed with 1.88 billion dollars to sub-Saharan Africa in order to 
improve health care, reduce poverty and social development in the area. Although 
economic aid is vital for several developing countries, the Oxfam (October 2004:10f) 
briefing paper demonstrated how the US aid in some cases were less than the economical 
damages the cotton producers experienced in relations with subsidies. Table three and 
four demonstrate the losses the C4 experienced as a result of the high US subsidy levels 
between cotton season 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 when the dispute started. 
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Source: Oxfam (October 2004), p. 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Losses for the C4 due to US subsidies - season 2001/2002 
 
Country  Actual cotton export 
earnings in 2001/02, in $m  
Export earnings with the 
withdrawal of US 
subsidies, in $m* 
Value lost as a 
result of US 
subsidies, in $m  
Benin  124  157  33  
Burkina Faso  105  133  28  
Chad  63  79  16  
Mali  161  204  43  
 
Total: 
 
453  
 
573  
 
120  
 
Source: Oxfam (2002), p. 18 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated economic losses due to US subsidies – season 2002/2003 
Country  
Estimated value of 
cotton exports 
2002/03* ($m)  
Estimated 2002/03 
export value with 
the withdrawal of 
US subsidies** 
($m)  
Estimated value lost as 
a result of US 
subsidies in 2002/03 
($m)  
Benin  199  213  14.3  
Burkina Faso  190  204  13.7  
Chad  79  85  5.7  
Mali  205  220  14.7  
Total  673  722  48.4 
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 The subsidy structure have however changed, Townsend presented that the major 
provider in 2012/2013 was no longer the US but China. The country distributed over 3 
billion dollars in cotton support, whereas US subsidy level had decreased to 820 million 
dollars (ICAC May 2013:4). Figure five demonstrates Chinas vastly increasing levels of 
cotton support and the decreased level of US support, and the change of structure on the 
global market. During the period 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 West African countries 
subsidised their cotton inputs, primarily for fertilizers and seeds for planting. (ICAC 
September 2013:5).	  	  	  
Figure 5: Cotton subsidies - season 2007/2008 (purple staple) and 2012/2013 (red 
staple), demonstrates the support to cotton production, and the change of structure over 
the years.  
 
Source: ICAC (May 2013), p. 5. 
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5:3 WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE  
The section will elucidate the WTO dispute settlement procedure in theory by a short 
description of the procedure and time period. The purpose is to clarify for the theoretical 
structure of the formal institution, to enable analytic study of the structure in praxis 
through the cases. Furthermore, the demonstration of the dispute settlement procedure 
also allows the thesis to specify the difference of formal and informal institutional 
structures. Such further understanding will later facilitate the analysis of the result. 
 
5:3:1 THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE SETTELMENT PROCEDURE 
The multilateral statue of the WTO is used as an organ of dispute settlement between 
members. If it is concluded that one or several members are not abiding by the 
constitution, actions can be taken in forms of a complaint. Furthermore, there is a 
possibility for a Third-Party to proclaim their interest in the matter. A judgment cannot be 
prevented except if there is a consensus from all the other WTO members that the dispute 
ought to be rejected. This is an agreement settlement procedure that differs from the old 
GATT system, changed according to the Uruguay Round agreement (WTO, 29th of 
October 2013).   
 
The liability for a settlement is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) i.e. elected Members 
of the WTO. The DSB is in charge of instituting a Panel of experts to examine the case, 
as well as, admit or discard conclusions or counterarguments from the Appellant Body. 
After jurisdiction of a dispute, the DSB supervise fulfilment of ruling and 
recommendation (ibid 2013).  
 
During the first phase of settlement the countries have 60 days to discuss if there is a 
possibility to settle the challenge, without taking legal actions within the WTO. There is a 
possibility for the WTO Director-General to mediate if this is proven unsuccessfully. 
However, if the meeting between the complainant and the respondent does not come to a 
conclusion a Panel needs to be established. The second phase includes an establishment 
of such a Panel, and the procedure can take up to 45 days. The panel is assigned to help 
the DSB to develop rulings and recommendations based on agreements cited. The panel 
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within a dispute settlement are equivalent to a tribunal/court of law, and consist of three 
to five experts on the disputed subject, from varies countries. The jurisdiction by the 
Panel can only be overruled by a consensus in the DSB, which consequently makes the 
result presented almost impossible to nullify. If the accused country disagrees to the Panel 
appointed, they are allowed to block once and a new Panel can be reformed. The second 
Panel can, however, only be blocked if there is unified agreement in the DSB (ibid 2013). 
 
Before the first hearing the dispute parties distributes the Panel with a written 
presentation of the issue. Both sides of the dispute and the Third-Party that declared an 
interest, presents their dispute instance. On the second hearing, the involved countries are 
able to propose opinions, both written and verbally, to the Panel. After the hearings both 
dispute parties is provided a first draft of the report arguments (excludning decision), on 
which they have up to two weeks to comment. Both dispute parties are after that provided 
a temporary report (including decision), which they have one week to ask for a review. 
The Panel can offer further mettings with both dispute parties during the review period 
that can last for two weeks. The report is given to dispute parties within six months, a 
time period that can be changed to three months if there is a sense of emergency. Three 
weeks later, the final panel report given to WTO members. If the Panel rule in favour to 
the challenging country the report has to include recommendations and procedures that 
follows WTO rules. Moreover, the Panel may also give implementation strategy. The 
report becomes a ruling or a recommendation within 60 days, if there is not a consensus 
overruling it, or there is an appeal. Both disputes parties have the power to authorise an 
appeal against the report. However, without an appeal, the settlement procedure within 
the WTO should have the total time period of a year (ibid 2013). 
 
APPEAL 
The report from the Appellate Body has to be presented within 60 or 90 days. Such report 
has to be based on legal grounds, early assessments of evidence remains, and it is not 
allowed to bring forth new evidence. The DSB can only reject the Appellate Body report 
by consensus. However, if the DSB adopts the report, it has to do so within 30 days. If the 
ruling decides that the country has violated an agreement they ought to correct their error 
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promptly. With an appeal the procedure should take an additional three months (ibid 
2013).  
 
The DSB state the importance of a rapid implementation of dispute recommendations and 
ruling, as that certifies a successful multilateral organisation of trade and formal 
institution. However, it is of significance to let the respondent implement the 
recommended policy and rulings accordingly. The respondent country has 30 days to 
implement rulings of the report. Nonetheless, if the implementation is unrealistic and 
shows difficulties to fulfil, the country is given a different, more sensible implementation 
period. If the agreement continues is to be disregarded, the accused country would have to 
submit compensation or be punished accordingly with retaliation, i.e. sanctions. The 
compensation will be determined though negotiations. If the agreement on compensation 
is not completed within 20 days the DSB have, on request by the complainant, the 
authority to distribute retaliation within the disputed area to the respondent. The DSB 
then have 30 days to allow such authorisation, a decision that can be rejected by 
consensus. If it is complicated and impractical to impose and there are further 
complications with the implementation of retaliation, it can be forced in another trade 
sector (ibid 2013).  
 
5:4 WTO AND THE COTTON ISSUE 
The last section in this chapter will highlight the disputes and proposals, which has been 
forwarded within the WTO to illuminate the cotton subsidy issue. The first part will 
elucidate three cotton subsidy decisions that already have been agreed on, however, 
actions have not yet been taken. The second part will clarify the processes of the US: 
Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute and the two different proposals forwarded by C4. 
The cases are central in the thesis in order to elucidate less powerful Members capability 
to carry through decisions within the WTO. The decisions made but not yet followed will 
demonstrate the importance on how decisions are received and followed by Members.  
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“Cotton is the only commodity that has selected, single focus within agriculture 
negotiation. That validates the importance in cotton decision-making” - WTO interview 
(10th of December 2013) 
 
5:4:1 DECISIONS MADE BUT NOT YET FOLLOWED 
In August 2004, an agreement of the July-Package was made during the General Council 
meeting. The package implies that WTO Members ought to improve in issues that are 
connected with cotton. It emphasised the significance of on cotton initiative, as well as, 
measures of development linked to cotton trade. Furthermore, the Council emphasised the 
significance of the Cotton Initiative and its further development. The Council stressed 
further development and institutional involvement on international level (WTO, 2004).  
 
In 2005, during the sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong further focus was applied 
upon problematic issue of cotton. The conference recollected the mandates that were 
agreed during the July Package, and highlighting the importance to address cotton issues 
that are linked to negotiations on agriculture trade policy. Issues influencing the cotton 
industries three standpoints on Market Access, Domestic Support and Export 
Competition, stated both in the Doha Round and the 2004 July-package The Hong Kong 
document, assumed by the Sub-Committee Cotton, and the propositions forwarded in 
relations to cotton issues, reassert the obligation to cotton and provide the sector with 
selected focus within agriculture negotiations, including actions taken by the DSB (WTO, 
2005).   
1. “All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries 
in 2006;  
 
2. On market access, developed countries will give duty and quota free access for 
cotton exports from least-developed countries (LDCs) from the commencement of 
the implementation period;   
 
3. Members agree that the objective is that, as an outcome for the negotiations, trade 
distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production be reduced more ambitiously 
than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it should be implemented 
over a shorter period of time than generally applicable. We commit ourselves to 
give priority in the negotiations to reach such an outcome” (WTO 2005) . 
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The Hong Kong Ministerial conference also suggested instituting bilateral donors, 
multilateral and regional institutions in order to increase and develop the level of 
consistency, management and improved execution of recommendations. Further 
suggested was an institution to handle diminution in the industry of cotton before subsidy 
levels are removed. The conferences also decided on initiating domestic reforms efforts 
by African farmers to improve and further develop the region production technic and 
proficiency (WTO, 2005).  
 
During the 2011 Ministerial Conference in Geneva the focus was on subsidies and high 
import liabilities that is impairing the market. Yet again a separate focus were applied on 
the cotton sector. The conference was encouraging efforts to improve the cotton trade, 
and also a progress for LDCs production. Furthermore, the Ministerial Conference 
demanded WTO Members to step up and reduce impairing agricultural subsidies, 
underlining the importance this being done in the cotton sector. The conference also 
stressed the importance to the follow up of aforementioned mandates agreed in 2004 and 
2005. It denoted the importance of focus on LDC cotton - to help raise the cotton issue 
further C4 and other Members had bilateral discussions (WTO, 2011).  
 
5:4:2 BRAZIL CHALLENGES 
In 2002 Brazil raised the issue and carried out the first official complaint towards the 
United States, claiming that the subsidies given to the American farmers contributed to an 
injustice cotton market, whilst American cotton enhanced further worldwide. On the 27 of 
September in 2002, Brazil filed a formal complaint against US agricultural subsidies on 
upland cotton. Claiming the subsidies measures provided to the US upland cotton 
producers, consumers and exports were not consistent with WTO agreements. Brazil 
argued that the subsidies were regulating the low price rates, with subsidy measures on an 
unacceptable level. Which, resulted in an uneven competitiveness on the world market, 
and other countries found it difficult gain a profit from their cotton production (WTO 
2009).  
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The WTO peace clause protects countries from being questioned of using domestic 
support, as long as it remained below the agreed 1992 levels. However, Brazil asserted 
that US cotton subsidies were not pursuant to the peace clause as their level had increased 
and doubled since 1992. The complaint towards US cotton subsidies were foremost direct 
payments distributed between 1996 and 2002, the 2002 Farm Bill which framework were 
influencing farmers on a global level, and payments under emergency supplemental 
appropriation bills. The US claimed that the cotton subsidies did not have a impair affect 
on the trade as they were decoupled, i.e. unrelated to production. The second claim were 
against following payments: Production Flexibility Contract that was distributed under 
the 1996 Farm Bill, and Direct Payments distributed through 2002 Farm Bill. Brazil 
asserted these payments were not decoupled payments, exceeding the Peace Clause 
allowed domestic level. Thus, disregarded laws and rules of the formal institutional rules 
of Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The third claim discussed the US program Step 2 
levels, compensation to exporters or American mills that is buying domestic upland 
cotton to a high price. The Step 2 subsidies were distributed through the Farm Bill as 
export subsidies. However, as it is attached to domestic support program it ought to be 
under the amber box. Therefore, Brazil claimed the US Step 2 program too disregarded 
regulations, this time under the Subsides and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement. The fourth claim had an effected not only on cotton but on other 
commodities. It implied that US Export Credit Guarantee programs and Supplier Credit 
Guarantee Program was violating agreements in AoA and SCM. The fifth claim stressed 
that US cotton subsides had triggered Serious Prejudice, which were producing an unjust 
market, impairing Brazilian exporters and its economy. Emphasising that between 1999 
and 2002 injury was vast due to the large subsidy distributions through US cotton 
programs. The sixth claim argued that the US government removal of tax duties for 
exporters of US upland cotton was violating the obligations for export subsidies of cotton. 
However, US stated that Brazil was lacking provision as they could not specify a case on 
the sixth claim, and therefore, not being able to form an appropriate argument, this was an 
assertion on which the Panel agreed with the US. (Schnepf 2008:31ff).  
 
In the beginning of October 2002, India, Zimbabwe, Argentina and Canada requested to 
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be included in the consultation meetings. The United States granted India and Argentina 
wish to take part. However, as the countries were not able to come to an agreement Brazil 
demanded to form a panel in February 2003. The DSB postponed, granting the wish after 
Brazils second application. A panel was formed the 19th of March in 2003. In this 
meeting, India, Pakistan, Venezuela and the European Communities reserved their Third-
Party right. Benin reserved its Third-Party rights on the 24th of March, followed by Chad 
Australia, Paraguay and New Zealand (WTO, 2009). The ACWL assisted Chad in 
formulating its proposals, and during partaking of Panel and Appellate Body hearings 
(Meagher, ACWL). A report were published to members on the 8th of September 2004, 
where it was established that: 
 
• “Agricultural export credit guarantees are subjected to WTO export subsidy 
disciplines and three United States export credit guarantee programmes are 
prohibited export subsidies which have no Peace Clause protection and are in 
violation of those disciplines; 
 
• The United States also grants several other prohibited subsidies in respect of cotton; 
 
• United States’ domestic support programmes in respect of cotton are not protected 
by the Peace Clause, and certain of these programmes result in serious prejudice to 
Brazil’s interests in the form of the price suppression in the world market” (WTO 
2009). 
 
 
APPEAL  
Brazil’s case against US subsidies prevailed, which resulted in an appeal from the US 
40 days after the report were published; the US reported the desire to appeal the 
arguments issued in the report quoted above. A report, by the Appellate Body was 
established, and on the 3rd of March in 2005 presented to Members. The Body’s 
counterargument concerning the Panel’s founding on the Peace Clause constituted the 
disputed measures of Production Flexibility Contract and Direct Payment, and asserted 
that the measures where not applicable to green box measures as they are interconnected 
to the production that started after the declared period. Furthermore, the US Appellant 
Body considered the Peace Clause to not conform to domestic support on upland cotton. 
In regards to the Panel’s challenges on serious prejudice the Appellant Body supported 
the conclusions of the subsidy programs influence and assertion to be a result to a price 
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deduction. However, the Body stressed that the link between the programs and price 
deduction is not evident; and, therefore, Brazil would not be able to prove that this was 
reason for serious prejudice to their cotton sector. Moreover, the Appellate Body 
supported that the user marketing (Step 2) payments for upland cotton were forbidden 
export subsidies that violated SCM agreements. The Appellate Body also supported the 
arguments stressing that US export credit guarantee programs were equivalent with 
export subsidies agreements in the SCM.  Hence, the US exports subsidy obligations was 
violating agreements (ibid 2009).  
 
SETTLEMENT  
The most debated and criticised cotton support has been the Step 2 program, which 
directs national tax income to cotton mills and exporter to enable national cotton to be 
sold below production costs. In 2004, about 264 million dollars of US tax income was 
directed via the Step 2 program, which results in a direct contribution to equalities on the 
cotton market (Woodward 2007:4). The recommendations concluded that the US Exports 
Credit Guarantees and Step 2 programs were to be removed within a six-month time-
period as the subsidies was illegalised. The subsidies that were adjudicated to produce 
Serious Prejudice were recommended to; either take action to remove the effects, or 
eliminate the support (WTO 2009).  
 
In July 2005, the arguments were discussed further, and Brazil notified it had plans to 
take countermeasures, involving withdrawal of tariff reduction in regions that is of 
importance to the complainant such as; further custom duties on listed imports from the 
US (ibid 2009). In 2006, the WTO established the fact that the US had not sufficiently 
improved its support programs in order to fulfil the recommendations (Oxfam, 2009). 
This resulted in an authorisation that permitted Brazil to inflict penalising trade measures 
appreciated to approximately 900 million dollars against the US (WTO interview). 
Hence, the US had to reform its cotton support program or consequently receive 
retaliation from Brazil. The retaliation not only implied an abnormal import tariff rate, but 
also a so called cross-retaliation. Giving Brazil permission to lift so-called patent 
protections on large range of US goods such as drugs, Hollywood films and US music. 
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This makes cross-retaliation prevailing, allowing the complainant to target profound 
economic areas in the US economy. Only two countries have been granted this form of 
retaliation before Brazil, however, no one has been forced to use it so far (The Guardian 
2012).  
In June 2008 the DSB admitted and modified the Panel report and the Appellant Body 
report. The dispute between Brazil and the US continued for over seven years. In 2010, it 
was announced that an annual funding of 147,3 million dollars was to be settled by the 
US government, providing Brazilian farmers with compensation for the damage 
American subsidies has caused to the Brazilian cotton sector. Furthermore, both the US 
and Brazilian Representative reported that a Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution 
to the Cotton Dispute had been decided upon. Both representatives emphasised the 
framework not being a joint settlement, but be used as guidelines for finding a resolution 
to Domestic Support programs for US Upland cotton and Export Credit Guarantees. The 
countries agreeing on having meetings approximately four times a year. As a result, 
Brazil decided to postpone the authorised retaliations towards American import duties, on 
conditions that the US continued the meetings, and attempted to solve the cotton dispute 
(WTO 2009).  
 
5:4:3 THE C4 CACÚN PROPOSAL  
The Doha Round has the ambition to improve the market structure, to construct a good, 
enhanced agricultural sector globally. The case was, therefore, presented with purpose to 
elucidate and remove the impairment of LDC cotton production, caused by cotton 
subsidies (WTO, 2003). In May 2003 a joint proposition were laid out by the C4, for 
cotton to be presented at the Cancún meeting in September 2003. Thirteen other West and 
Central African countries asserted that their single concern of the Doha Round was the 
removal of subsidies all together, and therefore supported the proposition (Gillson et al 
2004:20). Entitled Poverty Reduction: Sectorial Initiative in Favour of Cotton, and 
presented to the WTO’s Trade Negotiation Committee, it occasioned to implement an 
appliance that would eliminate subsidies for cotton production. The motivation for the 
proposal was based on the fact that a removal of the support programs was a necessity if 
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the production were to grow and develop to its full potential - a removal would contribute 
to reduction of poverty level in the LDCs cotton countries. Furthermore, the supporters of 
the proposal emphasise awareness of the complication of remove the subsidies directly, 
thus suggested phasing out the support programs. The supporters found that a phase-out-
period of three years (2004-2006) were reasonable and would imply a cotton subsidy 
decrease of 33.3 percent per year. This indicated a complete removal of cotton subsidies 
by the end of 2006, and an international free-market of cotton would consequently be re-
established. Furthermore, the C4 additionally presented a proposition to conduct a 
compensation structure for LDCs annually economic losses in export incomes. The 
compensation period would depend on the phase-out-period and have to be distributed 
before the cotton subsidies been completely removed. The compensation is declared in 
four phases, the first the compensation for the period 1999-2002. A study declare that 
cotton producers in West and Central Africa had direct losses of about 250 million dollars 
annually during this period, due to the subsidies distributed to other cotton producers. 
Emphasising that if the indirect losses would be incorporated in the calculation, the 
amount would be quadrupled – 1 billion dollars each year. During the second 
compensation phase the proposal reduces the compensation amount with one third. 
During the third phase the compensation would be based on the ICACs measurement on 
global cotton subsidy amount (WTO, 2003). 
 
The objective of the proposals combination of phasing out subsidies and compensation is 
to achieve a complete removal of subsidies and a free cotton market. The supporters of 
the proposal highlights that the compensation program ought to only be a temporary 
answer to the economic losses, and emphasis the advantages of a free-market. 
Furthermore, the supporters assured a transparent compensation transaction to the LDC 
cotton farmers would take place. The C4 also found it important that they had a direct 
part of the elimination process, as this will develop their competence and knowledge of 
the WTO. The C4 proposition failed, with no repercussion, during the meeting in Cancún 
(ibid 2003). 
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5:4:4 THE C4 PROPOSAL ON THE NINTH MINISTERAL CONFERENCE  
WTO meetings on cotton issues have been held repeatedly since 2004, under a program 
named Director General’s Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton. The meeting 
clarify the reports as aid for cotton, and issues as improvements and developments on 
discussions and cotton market environments are central (WTO October 2013).  
 
“The global trading system depends on countries obeying rules and submitting to orderly 
dispute resolution. Thus far, the US has ignored the ruling of the WTO adjudication and 
continues large subsidies for cotton production. If the US continues this way, the integrity 
of the multilateral trade system is at stake.” – (Oxfam 2009) 
 
During the first week of December 2013 a WTO conference took place in Bali. C4 
brought forward a proposal on cotton to be discussed during the meeting in October the 
same year. The C4 highlighted the importance that a provisional agreement had to be 
agreed upon during the meeting in Bali. There were four proposals carried through by 
LDCs countries afore the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9), cotton being one of 
them. The C4 proposal had support from India, the G-20 group (founded by developing 
countries due to the US and Brazil dispute), China, Pakistan, Australia, Uganda, and 
Mozambique. A provisional agreement would be of importance to able a long-term cotton 
discussion. Even though the proposal was presented rather late, there were a number of 
Members that took it upon themselves to investigate the achievable areas of the proposal 
before the meeting (WTO October 2013).  
 
The C4 proposal was grounded on the development of LDCs ability to trade with cotton, 
and suggested incorporation of duty-free, quota-free Market Access in both LDCs and 
developed countries. Furthermore, it suggested an urgent removal of Export 
Competition in developed countries, and demanded a conclusion on how to reduce 
cotton Domestic Support. The time-period on executed implementation and decision-
making was suggested by end of 2014/2015 (ibid 2013). 
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SETTLEMENT 
The meeting was successful and the Members agreed upon the Bali-Package. The 
package is part of the long time negotiated Doha Round, with objective to address 
inequalities in relations to the Uruguay Round. During the Ministerial meeting it was 
further emphasised that the afore decisions adopted on cotton during the General Council 
in 2004, the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, and obligations stated during the 
Geneva Ministerial Conference in 2011 have not yet been undertaken. The Ministerial, 
therefore, concurred on the importance to following through the decisions that has been 
made. Furthermore, it was agreed to assume that cotton trade from now on was to be 
treated with transparency and careful observation. Furthermore, meetings twice a year 
will be carried out with the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session in order to 
discuss the cotton trade in relation to the three proposals C4 forwarded – Market Access, 
Domestic Support and Export Competition. The meetings will elucidate issues on every 
type of exports subsidies, as well as export measures that have comparable results to 
export subsidies. The discussions will also contain issues on tariff measures and non-tariff 
measures effected cotton exported from LDCs, i.e. domestic support. Furthermore, the 
Bali declaration highlights the significance for both Members and Multilateral 
organisations to become more efficient with support to LDC. A Director-General’s 
Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton has been decided upon, with objective to 
improve cotton production and trade assisting factors in LDCs – for example 
infrastructure. Cotton related needs shall therefore be identified and given on different 
geographical levels. The declaration also urge the newly appointed WTO Director 
General, Robert Azevêdo, to report on the improvement on assistance in the cotton sector 
and on the implementing progress of the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declarations trade 
related approaches. The document from the Bali meeting (2013) also emphasise the 
progress and development that have happened within the African cotton sector. (WTO, 
Bali 2013:1f).  
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6.  RESULT 
The result will declare the interview results, and also refer to already establish facts in 
former studies. Furthermore, the result will estimate the future outcome within the cotton 
dilemma and whether the new agreement on the Bali-package is estimated to give result. 
 
Before the Ministerial Conference in Bali, between the 3rd and 6th of December 2013, 
ICAC presented the current leaders of cotton production as China (27 percent of the 
world production) and India (32 percent of the world production). Townsend stresses, that 
the cotton market adopts behaviour and influences though various trade disturbances. And 
there have been changes and developments in the sector lately. Hence, ICAC foresees that 
China and the US production of cotton will decline with reason of resource limitations. 
The US is expected to experience a production decrease already during the season 
2013/2014. The expected increase of production and export were from Brazil and the 
Francophone African countries (C4 included) (Townsend, 2013:16, 18). The ICAC states 
that in 2011/2012 about 10 countries were distributing subsidies to their industry. 
Furthermore, several cotton producing countries would want to see a re-regulation on 
American cotton subsidy programs, Farm Bill. Aisha Moriani, economic consultant for 
the Pakistan mission to the WTO in Geneva believes that the majority of countries that 
are producing cotton have gained from the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute. "We 
would very much like that no one would subsidies cotton, because we don't have the 
money to subsidies cotton … If prices fall, everyone should feel the pressure the same 
way” Moriani stresses (The Guardian 2013). The subsidy structure have however 
changed, Townsend presented that the major provider was no longer the US but China, 
who distributed over 3 billion dollars in cotton support in 2012/2013, whereas American 
subsidy level had decreased to 820 million dollars (ICAC May 2013:4). Figure five 
presented in the empiric study above give an account of change through a graph. 
Furthermore, during the period 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 West African countries 
subsidised their cotton inputs, primarily for fertilizers and seeds for planting. (ICAC 
September 2013:5). 
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6:1 US: SUBSIDIES ON UPLAND COTTON DISPUTE  
In 2011, Roberto Azevêdo, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the WTO, (recently 
appointed WTO Director General), visited Washington DC to discuss the Farm Bill and 
solution on the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute with Congressman Collin 
Peterson. In a formal letter Azevêdo later wrote that consequently to the lack of 
compliance with WTO recommendations in US cotton support programs, Brazil had no 
choice but to retaliate. However, Azevêdo stressed that withholding realisation of 
counter-measures have given the opportunity to temporary agreement between both states 
– involving compensation and US agreed to find a short-term resolution to the GSM-102 
program (Exports Credit Guarantee program), until a more long-term resolution could be 
realised through the upcoming Farm Bill (Robert Azevêdo 2012:1f and WTO interview). 
The 2008 US Farm Bill was supposed to terminate in 2012, but as the US had failed to 
present a replacing bill, they prolonged the bill to 20013/2014 (WTO 2009). 
Nevertheless. Brazil stated in 2013 that it wanted to continue the Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Framework Agreement and did not intend to offset any other 
actions considering that the US still had not reformed the country subsidy programs. "The 
deal is exactly this one. So we are going for the deal. If we preferred to retaliate, we 
would have done that before," – said the Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Alberto 
Figueiredo on December the 5th 2013 (World Trade Online, 2013). A statement that 
demonstrates the Memodrandum is yet to come to an agreement. However, Brazil has no 
plans to speed things up by retaliation. An other argument is that “the US came to the 
agreement to prevent domestic political collateral damage” (Baffes 2011:1539) Niall 
Meagher, Executive Director of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), stresses: 
 
“…as noted, the WTO dispute settlement system gives WTO Members, including the C4 
countries, an opportunity to enforce their rights under the WTO agreements. This is 
important especially since as noted the defending Member implements in the vast 
majority of cases.  However, it must be noted that the primary remedy provided by the 
system is that the defending Member complies going forward with its obligations. There is 
no redistributive remedy for prior injury and no guarantee of future commercial 
performance – merely the market access contained in the defending Member's WTO 
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commitments will be respected in the future…to some extent this is the price paid for 
Members' consent to a binding system of dispute settlement.  If the WTO had greater 
coercive power to "enforce its judgments", it is possible that Members would not be 
willing to participate in a binding system of dispute settlement” (Meagher, ACWL).  
 
Furthermore, Isabelle Ahlström from Kommerskollegium WTO unit asserts, that 
compensation rather than retaliation is an unusual turn in a WTO decision-making 
process. Although, it does not necessarily have to be a negative one - a dispute is meant to 
be resolved between the dispute parties; therefore, if the US and Brazil are content with 
the resolution, the dispute is solved. The resolution could also avoid a cross-retaliation 
which is preferable – both according to Martin Magnusson (2013-11-25), and the WTO 
source. “The objective is to minimize the chances of actions spilling over into unrelated 
sectors while at the same time allowing the actions to be effective” (WTO 29th of October 
2013). According to the WTO cross-boarder subsidies are not illegal. If this was not the 
case, Magnusson stresses, you might see a problem with the subsidy compensation to the 
Brazilian farmers. However, the importance is trade, and how that can be an implement to 
lift inhabitants of LDC out of poverty. A further decision-making would contribute to 
that. “…It usually is Brazil that speaks for the developing countries and minding their 
interests, thus, one can argue that this type of resolution is somewhat a taint on the WTO 
sky” (Magnusson, 2013-11-25). According to both the WTO source, and Andrei 
Guitchounts, director of trade analyses of the ICAC, the dispute has resulted in the 
elimination of Step 2 subsidy programs and GSM-102 “there has been an elimination of 
market distorting export subsidies, which will have a positive effect on the world cotton 
trade” (Guitchounts). However, Niall Meagher asserts: “the accommodation reached 
between the US and Brazil did not directly include the C4 countries because they were 
not complainants in the dispute (had they been, they would have had greater bargaining 
power to be involved in the settlement)”(Meagher, ACWL). Furthermore, Meagher 
believes that the C4 countries feel that they would gain more by joining Brazil as co-
complainants in the dispute. “That would have been possible for them with the assistance 
of the ACWL” (Meagher, ACWL). However, Meagher further stresses, the C4 countries 
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still did benefit from the US: Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute as it has contributed to 
the cotton issue being “very much a part of the WTO agenda” (Meagher, ACWL) 
 
6:2 ADVANTAGES AND DIFFICULTIES  
Isabelle Ahlström asserts that the time period of the dispute process can be dragged out; 
which is a disadvantage of the WTO as a dispute settlement device. The main problem, 
which has been emphasised by a majority of the interviewees, is the fact that WTO 
process of dispute settlement is very time consuming. The Members are aware of the time 
lapse that exits, which results in countries gambling more since it takes such a long time 
between when being accused of violating an undertaking  – to being sentenced in the 
WTO – to when the actual execution of implementation take place. Thus, it is a 
disadvantage that there are times when countries knowingly violate regulation within the 
constitution of the WTO (Magnusson, 2013-11-25).  
 
It is an advantage that a dispute mechanism exists - to solve through discussion rather 
than a dispute leads to war between countries. However, it is difficult to evaluate legal 
aspects against political. Countries have to undertake a legalisation, which the countries 
generally do commit to (Magnusson, 2013-11-25). Gary N. Horlick (2002:636f) asserts 
that although the new WTO system of dispute settlement (which was demonstrated in 
section five) is composed to be more transparent and efficient. There have been numerous 
cases that have shown such difficulties within the institution structure. Without 
transparency and efficiency there is a possibility for countries to challenge and undercut 
fundamental responsibilities that are established in the WTO agreements. Furthermore, 
Horlick states that structural difficulties can be revealed in the “lack of incentives for 
swift compliance, a lack of viable alternatives to trade sanctions, and a lack of 
consideration for the impact of the remedies on private actors” (Horlick, 2002:637).  
 
Being a small country it is difficult to retaliate against a larger country. To be competitive 
on the market it is equally important to import, as it is to export. If a Member country 
were to retaliate (like Brazil was authorised to), it would have to be equivalent to the 
amount of import during the certain time-lapse disputed. Magnusson declares this to be an 
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issue for LDC Members, and the reason for them principally not being able to retaliate if 
they did win a case within the WTO. They might not have the economic influence needed 
to make a point in retaliation (Magnusson, 2013-11-25). Baffes (2011:1534) note the fact 
that an agreement been made demonstrates less powerful Members ability to argue their 
interests within the statue of the WTO. The World Bank economist further argues the deal 
to establish the issue of the countries not being able to retaliate: “Unless the ‘injured’ 
party has enough trade leverage with the ‘guilty’ party, authorization of countermeasures 
– the typical WTO stimulus to encourage compliance – is of limited use (and is costly to 
the imposing country and does not assist cotton producers…)” (Baffes 2011:1534) An 
argument also noted by Magnusson during the interview.  
 
6:3 C4: s INFERIOR OR GOOD LEVELLED POSITION WITHIN THE WTO 
The reason for the negative approach towards the Cancún proposal 2003, a withdrawal of 
subsidies at the time, was inter alia the US interest in the industry, and their reassurance 
that other countries will not continue the subsidy distributions. China is for example not 
as transparent with the subsidy amount given. Therefore, such a proposition becomes 
somewhat irrelevant. The US wants to have control, and it was, therefore, too uncertain to 
be agreeing with the 2003 proposal (Ahlström, 2013-11-25). The WTO source further 
argues that this proposal was forwarded in an early stage in the addressing of cotton 
subsidies. The proposal inclined a strong call for subsidy cut that was difficult to carry 
through at the time, and, therefore, resulted in little or no appliance of the proposal. Niall 
Meagher from ACWL, asserts that reasons for C4 forwarding proposals rather than a 
complaint might be due to “(i) lacked familiarity with the process; (ii) been concerned 
about the cost; (iii) lacked the internal decision making structures to decide to proceed 
with a dispute; (iv) been concerned about possible political consequences of initiating a 
dispute” (Meagher, ACWL). 
 
Both WTO source and Kommerskollegium note the possibility of C4 being concerned of 
costs, and lack to comprehend the legal system. In a discussion paper composed by 
ActionAid et al (2014:2) the issue of cost is brought up, developing countries are not able 
to argue in defence of interest, as it is too costly to maintain representatives in Geneva. 
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Compared to US approximately 250 delegates, developing countries are not always able 
to keep representatives in all meetings. Developing countries have, therefore, been stating 
a concern on transparency and democracy when it comes to conferences and meetings 
(ibid, 2014.01.16:2f). ACWL note that legal advice from private counsel is vastly 
expensive, but the settlement process within the WTO is also complex and technical. 
Developing countries, especially LDCs do not possess the legal competence other 
Members, such as the US and the EU, have. Magnusson asserts, ACWL being an 
important legal unit, which allows LDC countries to stress legal issues, they otherwise 
might avoid, within the configuration of WTO. Meagher clarifies that ACWL helps 
balancing out the legal field of WTO dispute settlement. Allowing less legally powerful 
countries to participate fully within the WTO legal system, and to benefit and improve 
from their WTO Memberships.  
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7.  ANALYSIS 
The Cotton Dilemma is a case study that demonstrates something bigger; it is an example 
on how the political play within WTOs multinational institution appears. In order to 
comprehend thesis standpoints and main question, by what means less political powerful 
countries (such as C4) carry through decisions, the conclusion will highlight analytical 
thoughts based on the result and theoretical instance. Thus, it will illuminate the main 
results of thesis and its future challenges. Due to earlier decision made but not yet 
followed, the conclusion underlines the problem further, where the process of 
implementation is vital if a proposal or a dispute is to take the required effect on a 
national level. For what is a decision without action? 
 
7:1 GRADUAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Frischmann argues that international agreements are a result of nations being economic 
and social interdependent to one and other. For this reasons have national decisions and 
purpose an impact on other nations trade and social-welfare. Evidently, this has been 
proven in several articles and reports on the cotton issue. Since development of 
institutional change is complex and done gradually, one can argue that the decision-
making on cotton, therefore, gradually been happening since the beginning of the first 
dispute in 2002. Cotton market adopts behaviour though various trade disturbances, and 
the different cases are phases of a gradual institutional change. Furthermore, the notion of 
a gradual change is also noted in the Cancún proposal where supporters found a phase-
out-period of three years being reasonable. Thus, an approach on how to administrate 
both decision-making and implementation was in some way set in the 2003 proposal. 
However, several institutional limitations and difficulties have been part of the cotton 
dilemma, which made the process longer than the three-year phase-out-period suggested 
by C4.  
 
Members are aware of the time-lapse that exists between being accused of violating an 
undertaking, to when the implementation actually have to be effectuated. This has formed 
an informal institution of behaviour that allows countries to gamble during settlement 
	   55	  
procedures time-period. In the sense of international institutions being “seen as the 
domain of anarchy, rather than an area in which stable institutions operate” (Peters 
1999:151) - one can argue that Members attitude have developed conscious violation of 
settlements and regulation within the constitution of the WTO when it comes to cotton. 
Although, formal institution changes (decision-makings) can happen over night, the 
informal attitudes on cotton decisions have haltered the implementation process. The US 
case resulted in retaliation, which led to compensation, in which all settlement 
recommendations still not have been effectuated. Thus, such attitudes can inflict damage 
on exporters, especially in developing countries where the export base might not be so 
varied. This is a disadvantage in the formal institution of the WTO settlement mechanism, 
where attitudes towards change in the cotton sector have resulted in formal limitations. 
The direct formal institution influences the formal structure and legislation of the 
institution. Whereas, informal institutions demonstrate change through traditions and 
behaviour, codes of conduct, which North asserts are more reluctant to change. Change, 
therefore, need to come from both links. In theory, WTO appears to have a well-
developed timeframe, however, the reality depicts circumstances that are rather different.  
 
The Brazil and US case also demonstrates how decision-making has been effectuated in 
the illegalisation on Step 2 and GSM-102 subsidy. Thus, the implementation of market 
distorting exports subsidies will have a positive effect on the world cotton trade; and 
therefore a positive influence on C4 farmers. Furthermore, Brazil has been given 
authority to cross-retaliate against the US. One can dispute, that the statement on how 
institutional space demonstrates a definition of hierarchy trough the different levels of 
governance - also displays the difference in level of implementation and methods to carry 
out a discontent within the institution. The broad countermeasures of a cross-retaliation, 
provide smaller economies with the power to initiate a powerful country, such as the US, 
to comply with recommendations given. This ought to result as a block of such a large 
loophole, that otherwise could give powerful countries margin to “gamble” and disregard 
implementation before they will be forced to effectuate. The retaliation has not been 
affected, which reflex on an informal approach strategy that instead result in lack of 
implementation.  
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7:2 C4s POSITION WITHIN THE CONFIGURATION OF WTO  
There are many ways for the C4 to proceed in a dispute. Although, ACWL would, as 
expressed by the interviewee, be able to provide C4 with help as for example a co-
complaint. A proposal is probably the best way to go forward in the absent of capital and 
recourses. Babu expressed that the impairment exporters already have experienced cannot 
be redeemed in the current WTO system. There is no compensation during an 
implementation period. For a farmer in a developing county the time consuming structure 
within the institution are at the moment the greatest threat to their development. 
Although, the C4 also can go forward as a Third-Party, were ACWL also have been 
helpful during the US: Upland cotton subsidy dispute, there is a point in Meagher 
assessment that the C4 countries would have gain more by joining Brazil as co-
complainants in the dispute. A cross-retaliation should provide smaller economies with 
the power to initiate a powerful country to implement the ruling. However, as several 
researchers and Magnusson states, there are difficulties for LDC countries, such as C4, to 
enforce retaliation (even cross-retaliation) that would hurt the economy for a country like 
the US. This also confirm Babus statement that LDC Members within the WTO can find 
it meaningless to forward a costly complaint, when the implementation level from 
developed country is expected to be low even before the decision been made. If the LDC 
after that cannot provide a powerful retaliation, it is understandable that there is a lack of 
trust in the international WTO institution as a dispute settling mechanism. One can claim 
that the compensation, that C4 proposed 2003 in Cancún, during the suggested phase-out-
period was due to the consideration of the time consuming-structure. C4 knew the 
implementation and phasing-out-period might extend the time its been given. 
Compensation, therefore, minded the damage the farmers are exposed to during this 
period – and even an incentive to speed things up.  
 
Although, the C4 Cancún proposal failed, the dispute settlement between Brazil and the 
US was a milestone for Brazil as a developing country. As a speaker for developing 
countries, (including C4) the result demonstrates the ability for less powerful countries to 
carry through a dispute within the WTO. However, LDC countries like C4 are still 
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somewhat limited within the WTO, which reflects in the decisions on carrying out cotton 
issues through proposals and not complaints. Several of the interviewees noted C4s 
limitations in capital. Furthermore, institutional thickness should demonstrate a 
comprehensiveness and institution structure, in order to develop purpose and agenda. The 
lacking knowledge and understanding in such legally complicated and technical 
institution, is a further limitation for the C4. This kind of restriction was raised in the 
2003 proposal in Cancún, where the supporting countries asked to have a direct part of 
the elimination process, in order to develop their competence and knowledge of the 
WTO. A suggestion, one can claim, ought to be regarded in the Bali-package. ACWL 
allows LDC countries to stress legal issues within the configuration of WTO, and 
therefore help the balance of the legal field of WTO dispute settlement. The institution 
not only helps LDCs to take advantage of the membership, but also improve 
understanding of the WTO through participation. It could therefore be reasonable to 
conclude that ACWL contributes to an institutional thickness and development within the 
WTO.  
 
Evidently, the lack of decision-making has affected the C4 farmers negatively. The 
negative approach during the 2003 proposal was due to the informal attitude and 
valuation of the notion was not prepared for a change - as the proposal was forwarded in 
an early stage in the cotton subsidies debate. Several interviewees and Hayter et al 
mentioned that US was not reassured that other countries will not continue the subsidy 
distributions. China is for example not as transparent with the subsidy amount given. This 
is yet again a question of lack in informal institution. Trust is an important notion within 
all levels of institution. Therefore, the new emphasis on transparency in the Bali-package 
is of great importance and would move the improvement of cotton trade further if it was 
implemented. Furthermore, developing countries have been stressing the lack of 
transparency when it comes to conferences and meetings. Therefore it is of great 
importance that the Bali-package requests that, at each WTO Ministerial Conference, the 
Director General reports the progress on the cotton issue and implementation elements of 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. The institution is trying to adjust prejudice 
subsidy legally, however, institutional differences and attitudes in an international 
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institution like WTO brings on limitations. This demonstrates how an institutional space 
of such a multinational institution is less distinct, which also contributes to the attitude 
change happening gradually – and the fact that the cotton issue is being such an important 
part of the WTO agenda is significant for future development.  
 
The Bali-Package is an historical agreement. The massive necessity of cotton trade in the 
C4 countries could contribute to a development of living standard for C4 farmers, and 
make competitiveness on the cotton market essential. This marks the Bali-package as an 
important milestone for the cotton dilemma and LDC within the WTO. Not only because 
a decision is made on the Doha-Round, but also because it include a proposal forwarded 
by the C4.  
 
Moreover, it is reasonable to argue the importance of earlier decisions adopted on cotton 
in 2004, 2005, and 2011 being emphasised as not undertaken in the Bali document. The 
argument on the importance of implementing decisions that already have been made is 
significant, as this further emphasis the issue of lack of implementation as well as 
violation of agreements. The ICAC reported an expecting increase on production and 
export levels in the C4 countries. Although, the agreement does not replace prior 
prejudice, and there is no security of future performances. However, the gradual change 
within the institution attitude towards the cotton issue, and it being a central part of the 
WTO agenda, hopefully gives the Bali-package good prospects and efficiency.  
 
Babu presents an interesting aspect on an informal attitude rooted within the legal 
structure of WTO, which results in a difficulty to uphold a fair play. In 
consideration to progress in the WTO to become an institution which can provide 
development, it is necessary that LDC and developing countries participating in 
proposals and presenting reasons in development and change in order to effectuate 
and improve WTO structure. Hence, the initiative from the C4 have been positive 
effect on both the cotton issue and possibly even on the informal structure of the 
WTO. 
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7:3 CONCLUSION 
The lack of full implementation is a great concern and so is the time-consuming dispute 
settlement structure, which Members take advantage of. The fact that there is no 
compensation during the implementation period can be devastating for a farmer in a 
developing county - the time consuming structures have an impairing effect. One can 
argue that a compensation system during the implementation period, similar to the one C4 
suggested in their 2003 proposal, might be of use. The system would be based on the time 
period over argued economic damage and might be a resolution to overcome the time 
consuming dispute settlement structure. Furthermore, the compensation might also result 
in a change of informal attitude and decrease the level of violation of agreements. 
However, Meagher asserted in the interview that “if WTO had greater coercive power to 
"enforce its judgments", it is possible that Members would not be willing to participate in 
a binding system of dispute settlement” (Meagher, ACWL) - compensate during 
implementation period can be seen as such coercive power of enforcement.  
 
Studying Brazils dispute case and C4s proposal during the Bali meeting; it is evident that 
less powerful Members are able to argue their cases in the WTO. However, the means of 
accomplishment are different to larger economies. Organisations such as the ACWL are, 
therefore, central in order of pushing issues of development purposes for LDCs. Change 
and development needs to come from both formal and informal attitudes. The C4 
proposals have had not only changed the formal institution of cotton issue, but also 
contribute to a progressive informal change of the Member attitude on the matter. The 
formal institutional changes within the WTO cotton sector may result in (and already 
have to some extent) a change of trade and production. Furthermore, it is vital for future 
productions in both developing and developed countries that change of regulations will be 
carried out. Trust is an important notion and, therefore, the Bali-Package agreement on 
transparency is of great importance to impose development in the cotton sector. 
Nevertheless, without implementation the issues caused by cotton subsidy will go on. 
Therefore, the request in the Bali-package that at each WTO Ministerial Conference, the 
Director General report the progress on the cotton issue and implementation elements of 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration is central in order to improve and pushing 
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through developments of the issue further. Furthermore, it allows the LDC countries to 
participate in the institution, which provides the understanding and institution knowledge 
they are lacking and might balance out the legal field of WTO dispute settlement. 
Knowledge can affect political structures; transparency and C4 participant might 
challenge those set structures within the WTO.  
 
Moreover, taken into consideration the increase of subsidies in China, future decisions 
and effectuation should not only concentrate on the US Farm Bill, but also embrace 
emerging economies. Since China is the major importer of C4 cotton, a focus on 
emerging economies is of great importance if the C4 is to precede and develop its cotton 
sector.  
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